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Substantially Burdened, Substantially in Conflict, or
Substantially Unneeded? A Discussion of Abdulhaseeb
v. Calbone
I. INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone1
highlights the difficulty and conflicting rules courts face in
determining when the government has placed a substantial burden
on an inmate’s religious rights. In Abdulhaseeb, the Tenth Circuit
considered the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act2 (“RLUIPA”), which provides, inter alia, that “[n]o government
shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a
person residing in or confined to an institution.”3 Although the
substantial burden requirement of RLUIPA is fundamental to the
statute’s application, the term is not defined within the statute, and
circuit courts have differed in their interpretation of this
requirement. To address this problem, the Tenth Circuit attempted
to synthesize the various circuit rules by holding that a government
substantially burdens an inmate’s religious expression if it
(1) requires participation in an activity prohibited by a
sincerely held religious belief, or (2) prevents participation in
conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief, or (3)
places substantial pressure on an adherent either not to
engage in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious
belief or to engage in conduct contrary to a sincerely held
religious belief.4
This Note argues that the Tenth Circuit’s synthesized rule is
problematic for two reasons. First, by combining the two prevalent
but different tests used in the different circuits into one test, the rule
undermines precedent and exacerbates the friction between the
various circuit rules. Second, the third part of this rule provides little

1. 600 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2010).
2. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1 to
-5) (2006).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2006).
4. Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1315.
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guidance for application and opens the door for judges to base their
decisions on their preferences instead of precedent.
Part II of this Note discusses the facts and history of
Abdulhaseeb. Part III discusses the context, political situation, and
background leading up to the decision in Abdulhaseeb. Finally, Part
IV discusses the problems inherent in the third part of the test
postulated by the Tenth Circuit and the resulting need to eliminate
that prong.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
From June 4, 2001, to January 27, 2005, Madyun Abdulhaseeb
was incarcerated at Great Plains Correction Facility (“GPCF”).5
While a prisoner at GPCF, Abdulhaseeb requested that he be
provided with a halal diet, but his requests were denied.6 After three
years of incarceration, Abdulhaseeb submitted a formal grievance
charging that GPCF forced him to accept gelatin and puddings on
his meal trays in violation of his beliefs.7 Abdulhaseeb argued that,
although GPCF indicated that the pudding and gelatin were halal
and kosher, there was nothing on the packaging to substantiate that
claim; thus, GPCF should have provided him with a satisfactory halal
substitute.8 The administrator at GPCF denied Abdulhaseeb’s
grievance and indicated that no one was forcing Abdulhaseeb to have
gelatin or pudding on his tray.9 The administrator also noted that
there was no pork or pork byproduct in the gelatin or pudding;
therefore, in his opinion, those products met Abdulhaseeb’s religious
standards.10
A month after GPCF denied his initial grievance, Abdulhaseeb
filed another grievance with GPCF arguing that the prison should
provide halal chickens for all the prisoners in celebration of the
5. Id. at 1306. Oklahoma contracts with GPCF, a private prison, to hold Oklahoma
prisoners. Id.
6. Id. A halal diet, also known as a “lawful” diet, prohibits consumption of food that is
deemed to be unlawful (“haram”). Id. at 1313. It requires one to abstain from eating “pork
and its byproducts, animals improperly slaughtered or killed, alcohol and intoxicants, blood
and blood byproducts, and foods contaminated with haram products.” Id. (citing What is
Halal?, ISLAMIC FOOD AND NUTRITION COUNCIL OF AMERICA, http://www.ifanca.org/
halal/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2011)).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1307.
10. Id.
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Islamic feast Eid-ul-Adha.11 Again, GPCF denied his request for
accommodation.12 The GPCF administrator stated that “DOC policy
allows you [Abdulhaseeb] to purchase a Hallal meal through an
approved vendor. The practice at GPCF, which includes the current
year, is to provide a Hallal meal at the conclusion of Ramadan” but
not for the Eid-ul-Adha feast.13 After receiving this denial,
Abdulhaseeb unsuccessfully appealed to the Oklahoma Department
of Corrections (“ODOC”).14
Three months after his second grievance, GPCF transferred
Abdulhaseeb to the Oklahoma State Penitentiary (“OSP”), a prison
administered by ODOC.15 After arriving at OSP, Abdulhaseeb again
requested a halal diet.16 Specifically, he wrote a letter stating, “I am a
Muslim. I request a Halal diet that is consistent with my sincerely
held religious beliefs and does not substantially burden my freedom
of religious expression. . . . Your non-pork common fare diet and
vegetarian diet are not diets that are consistent with Islamic dietary
laws.”17 Like the GPCF administrators, OSP officials denied his
request and responded by indicating that they only provided two
alternative diets for religious reasons: non-pork and vegetarian.18
After receiving this denial, Abdulhaseeb filed another grievance
asking for a halal diet, but OSP again denied his request, citing the
two alternative diets available to Abdulhaseeb.19 Abdulhaseeb again
unsuccessfully appealed to ODOC.20
Following ODOC’s denial of his request, Abdulhaseeb filed
seventeen claims21 in district court alleging, inter alia, that GPCF and
OSP violated his rights under RLUIPA by not providing him with a
halal diet.22 GPCF and OSP both moved for summary judgment on
all seventeen counts, and the district court entered judgment in favor
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
1308–09.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1307–08.
Abdulhaseeb filed twelve claims against GPCF and five claims against OSP. Id. at
Id. at 1308.
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of GPCF and OSP on eight of the claims and dismissed the
remainder of the claims.23 Abdulhaseeb then appealed to the Tenth
Circuit.24
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Religious Practices and Inmates
Religious practices are very prevalent among prison inmates
within the United States prison system.25 For instance, one study
conducted in the South Carolina prison system found that nearly half
of prison inmates attend religious services, and that those who attend
do so six times a month on average.26 This is seen as a positive trend,
since the number and severity of inmate infractions decreases as
inmates become more involved with religious practices.27 In
addition, courts have noted that “deny[ing] the opportunity to
affirm membership in a spiritual community . . . may extinguish an
inmate’s last source of hope for dignity and redemption,”28 which
may decrease the likelihood of rehabilitation for an inmate.
Consequently, religion is “one of the best rehabilitative influences
we can have” on inmates.29
B. Religious Expression: A Varying Standard
The legal standard for determining an inmate’s right to religious
expression has varied over time. Initially, recognizing the need for a
framework to protect the individual’s right of religious expression,
the Supreme Court held, in Sherbert v. Verner,30 that the government
cannot pass a law that infringes on an individual’s religious liberties
unless the law survives strict scrutiny; that is to say, unless the
23. Id. at 1309. Judgment was not entered on claims 6–9 and 14–17 because the court
held that they were not ripe due to non-exhaustion of remedies. Id.
24. Id.
25. Thomas P. O’Connor & Michael Perreyclear, Prison Religion in Action and Its
Influence on Offender Rehabilitation, in RELIGION, THE COMMUNITY, AND THE
REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS 11, 12 (Thomas P. O’Connor & Nathaniel J.
Pallone eds., 2002).
26. Id. at 21.
27. Id. at 11.
28. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 368 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. 139 CONG. REC. S14,367 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Orrin
Hatch).
30. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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government demonstrates that the law achieves a “compelling state
interest” and utilizes the least restrictive means of achieving that
interest.31 The Court further upheld this judicial requirement in
Wisconsin v. Yoder32 by concluding that “only those interests of the
highest order . . . can overbalance legitimate claims to the free
exercise of religion.”33 Thus, if a law infringed upon religious
expression, it had to be the least restrictive means of achieving a
compelling interest of the highest order to pass the stringent test
articulated in Sherbert and Yoder.
During the 1970s and 1980s, courts continued to apply the
rationale of Sherbert and Yoder to free exercise claims by prisoners.34
Beginning in the late 1980s, however, the Court departed from its
reasoning in Sherbert and Yoder by subjecting laws that infringed
upon religious expression to a standard that resembled, though was
not explicitly, rational basis review.35 This more deferential review
continued until finally, in Employment Division v. Smith,36 the Court
explicitly rejected the “compelling governmental interest” standard
of Sherbert altogether and replaced it with rational basis review.37
Although this was a departure from its prior standard, the Court
reasoned that generally applicable laws that incidentally burden
religious expression were subject only to rational basis review—not
strict scrutiny.38
C. Statutory Responses to Smith
In response to the Supreme Court’s application of the rational
basis standard to a religious freedom case, Congress passed the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act39 (“RFRA”), which effectively

31. Id. at 406, 407.
32. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
33. Id. at 215.
34. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Meachem, 540 F.2d 1057 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Fisher, 571 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Masjid Muhammad-D.C.C. v. Keve, 479 F. Supp.
1311 (D. Del. 1979).
35. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350–51 (1987); Daniel J. Solove,
Faith Profaned: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Religion in the Prisons, 106 YALE
L.J. 459, 470 (1996) (discussing the evolution of rational basis and strict scrutiny in regards to
religious expression).
36. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
37. Id. at 885–89.
38. Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006).
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legislatively reversed Smith and reinstituted the strict scrutiny
standards from Sherbert and Yoder.40 The pertinent sections of RFRA
prohibited the government from “substantially burden[ing] a
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability”;41 yet, the Act did not define “substantially
burden.”42
However, four years after Congress passed RFRA, the Supreme
Court, in City of Boerne v. Flores, struck down the Act as applied to
state and local governments.43 The Court reasoned that because
Congress has only the “power ‘to enforce,’ not the power to
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation,” Congress
exceeded its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment when it
passed RFRA.44
Congress responded to the Court’s holding in Flores by enacting
RLUIPA three years later. RLUIPA closely mirrors the provisions of
RFRA, but limits its scope to land use and institutionalized
persons.45 The Act provides that
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an
institution . . . unless the government demonstrates that
imposition of the burden on that person (1) is in furtherance
of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.46
While RLUIPA, like RFRA, failed to explicitly define “substantial
burden,” the legislative history indicates that it is to be interpreted in

40. See Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise
Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 102 (1996); Abbott Cooper, Dam the RFRA at the Prison Gate:
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s Impact on Correctional Litigation, 56 MONT. L. REV.
325, 325–26 (1995).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
42. 146 CONG. REC. S16,698, 16,700 (July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin
Hatch and Sen. Edward Kennedy).
43. See 521 U.S. 507, 532–36 (1997). However, the federal government still must
follow RFRA. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
424 (2006).
44. Flores, 521 U.S. at 519.
45. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5; Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567 (5th Cir.
2004).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
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reference to RFRA and its jurisprudence.47 As a result, circuit courts
have interpreted RLUIPA according to RFRA and its jurisprudence,
yet still significantly differ as to when government action
substantially burdens an inmate’s religious beliefs.
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION
In Abdulhaseeb, a three-member panel of the Tenth Circuit
reversed the district court’s decision to grant GPCF and OSP’s
motions for summary judgment.48 Specifically, the court held that
GPCF and OSP may have “substantially burdened” Abdulhaseeb’s
religious exercise by refusing to provide him with a halal diet or halal
chickens for the Eid-ul-Adha feast.49
A. General Requirements of RLUIPA
In deciding whether GPCF and OSP violated RLUIPA, the
court reasoned that RLUIPA required Abdulhaseeb to demonstrate
that he desired to participate in “(1) a religious exercise (2)
motivated by a sincerely held belief, which exercise (3) [was] subject
to a substantial burden imposed by the government” to succeed in
his claims.50 The court briefly discussed the general elements of the
first two requirements, but reasoned that since GPCF and OSP did
not challenge the “religious nature of Abdulhaseeb’s beliefs” and
there was no evidence in the record that Abdulhaseeb did not
sincerely hold his expressed beliefs, it did not need to rule on these
issues.51 Rather, the court held that the dispositive issue was whether

47. 146 CONG. REC. S16,698, 16,700 (July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin
Hatch and Sen. Edward Kennedy). See also Grace United Methodist Church v. City of
Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 661 (10th Cir. 2006) (concluding that the substantial burden
standard under RFRA applied to RLUIPA).
48. Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1309 (10th Cir. 2010). Although
Abdulhaseeb alleged seventeen different claims against OSP and GPCF, this Note is only
concerned with claims five and ten, which allege that GPCF and OSP violated RLUIPA by
denying Abdulhaseeb a halal diet.
49. Id. at 1315.
50. Id. at 1312–13 (citing Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 960 (10th Cir. 2001)).
51. Id. at 1313–15. In his concurrence, Judge Gorsuch explicitly stated that the “only
question before the court is whether the government has imposed a substantial burden” since
the government did not contest Abdulhaseeb’s “religiosity or the sincerity of [his] beliefs.” Id.
at 1324 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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the government “substantially burdened” Abdulhaseeb’s religious
exercise.52
B. Defining “Substantial Burden” under RLUIPA
Abdulhaseeb presented the Tenth Circuit with its first
opportunity to interpret the meaning of “substantial burden” under
RLUIPA.53 The court, after reviewing other circuit decisions that
clarified the term, concluded that the government substantially
burdens an individual’s religious exercise when it
(1) requires participation in an activity prohibited by a
sincerely held religious belief, or (2) prevents participation in
conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief, or (3)
places substantial pressure on an adherent either not to
engage in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious
belief or to engage in conduct contrary to a sincerely held
religious belief.54
The court opined that the first and second parts of the rule were
self-explanatory, but believed that the third part, “substantial
pressure,” needed additional explanation.55 To explain the third part
of its rule, the court provided several examples.56 First, the court
concluded that a government substantially pressures an inmate if it
provides him or her with a “Hobson’s choice.”57 The court defined a
Hobson’s choice as an “illusory choice where the only realistically
possible course of action trenches on an adherent’s sincerely held
religious belief.”58 Essentially, if the government requires an inmate
to choose between eating food that the inmate considers against his
religious beliefs or not eating at all, then the court would consider
the choice a Hobson’s choice.59
Second, in accordance with congressional intent,60 the court
reviewed Supreme Court decisions prior to Smith that defined
52. Id. at 1315 (majority opinion).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1315.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1317.
60. See 146 CONG. REC. S16,698, 16,700 (July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch and Sen. Edward Kennedy).
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“substantial burden” and parenthetically reasoned that “substantial
pressure on an adherent to modify . . . behavior”61 and “indirect
coercion or penalties”62 were additional examples of substantial
pressure sufficient to constitute a substantial burden. The court
provided several other parenthetical observations but concluded that
not “every infringement on a religious exercise will constitute a
substantial burden,”63 and that the court would need to evaluate on
a case-by-case basis the level of inconvenience to an individual’s
religious practice in order to determine whether the burden should
be considered “substantial.”64
C. Did OSP Violate RLUIPA by Failing to Provide Abdulhaseeb with
a Halal Diet?
After defining the third part of the rule, the Tenth Circuit
considered whether OSP substantially burdened Abdulhaseeb’s
religious expression by not providing him with a halal diet. In
particular, the court concluded that the government substantially
pressured Abdulhaseeb because it left him with a Hobson’s choice:
Abdulhaseeb could either eat a diet that violated his sincerely held
belief, or not eat at all.65 The court reasoned that “it is one thing to
curtail various ways of expressing belief, for which alternative ways of
expressing belief may be found. It is another thing to require a
believer to defile himself, according to the believer’s conscience, by
doing something that is completely forbidden by the believer’s
religion.”66 In addition, the court noted that other courts have held
that failure to provide a halal diet may substantially burden the
religious exercise of a Muslim.67
61. Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec.
Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981)).
62. Id. at 1316 (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439,
450 (1988)).
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004)).
65. Id. at 1317.
66. Id. (quoting Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir. 2002)).
67. Id. (citing Hudson v. Dennehy, 538 F. Supp. 2d 400, 411 (D. Mass. 2008);
Thompson v. Williams, No. C06-5476FDB-KLS, 2007 WL 3244666, at *19 (W.D. Wash.
Oct. 31, 2007); Caruso v. Zenon, No. 95-MK-1578 (BNB), 2005 WL 5957978, at *12 (D.
Colo. July 25, 2005)). Moreover, Judge Gorsuch, in his concurrence, noted that “[t]o say that
access to edible food qualifies as ‘an important benefit’ is to put it mildly” and that the
government substantially pressured Abdulhaseeb’s religious expression by not providing a halal
diet. Id. at 1325 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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OSP argued that it did not force Abdulhaseeb into a Hobson’s
choice because it allowed the option of purchasing a halal diet from a
possible outside vendor, but the court rejected this argument.68 The
court first noted that this is an unreasonable option for an indigent
inmate, such as Abdulhaseeb, since he would still effectively be
barred from obtaining the halal food as he lacked the requisite
finances.69 Moreover, the court, citing an affidavit from a chaplain at
GPCF,70 noted that there was no approved halal vendor for ODOC,
and that it was ODOC’s policy that all vendors be preapproved
before they could deliver food.71 Thus, although a cursory analysis
seemed to indicate that Abdulhaseeb did have methods to obtain a
halal diet, this nonetheless was not the case while he was incarcerated
at OSP, since both OSP and GPCF had the same food policies.72
However, although withholding a halal diet may have substantially
burdened Abdulhaseeb’s religious exercise, the court remanded
Abdulhaseeb’s claim on different grounds: that the government
failed to address whether the burden resulted from a “compelling
governmental interest” along with whether the government used the
“least restrictive means” in accomplishing its interest.73
D. Was the Denial of Halal Meat for an Islamic Feast a Substantial
Burden to Abdulhaseeb’s Religious Exercise?
After considering whether OSP may have substantially burdened
Abdulhaseeb’s religious exercise, the Tenth Circuit next considered
Abdulhaseeb’s additional claim that GPCF’s failure to provide halal
meat for an Islamic feast, Eid-ul-Adha, violated RLUIPA.74 The
court began by explicitly rejecting the district court’s reasoning that
the “failure to celebrate the Feast itself would [not] substantially
burden . . . [Abdulhaseeb’s] religious exercise.”75 Specifically, the
68. Id. at 1317 (majority opinion).
69. Id. But see id. at 1326 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (indicating that RLUIPA does not
require “the state to provide prisoners—even indigent prisoners—with everything they need
for religious purposes”).
70. Although the court was evaluating the actions of OSP, the court used testimony of a
GPCF chaplain since GPCF and OSP both fall under ODOC and follow ODOC policies. Id.
at 1317–18 (majority opinion).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1318.
74. Id. at 1319–20.
75. Id. at 1319.
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court reasoned that the district court erred by not inferring from
Abdulhaseeb’s complaint that Abdulhaseeb wanted to “observe a
halal diet for both feast and non-feast days, and that halal meat is
important to this feast.”76 The court also decided that “if an inability
to eat proper foods for a religious holiday prevents one from
engaging in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief or
forces one to engage in conduct prohibited by a sincerely held
religious belief, it may constitute a substantial burden.”77
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit rejected the district court’s
reasoning that failure to provide halal meat on Eid-ul-Adha did not
violate RLUIPA, since the “faith community” could purchase festive
or ceremonial meals according to ODOC policy.78 Particularly, the
Tenth Circuit noted that ODOC policy requires halal meat to be
purchased from an “approved vendor,” but the record indicated no
such vendor existed.79 As a result, the court concluded that there
may have been periods when there was no approved halal vendor for
GPCF; thus, there may have been a time where Abdulhaseeb’s
religious exercise was substantially burdened.80 The court held that
this fact might allow a reasonable jury to find that GPCF
substantially burdened Abdulhaseeb’s religious exercise by
prohibiting halal meat for the Eid-ul-Adha feast. Consequently, the
court remanded his claim.81
V. ANALYSIS
This case is an example of the Tenth Circuit wanting to have its
cake and eat it too: the Tenth Circuit wanted the benefits of
synthesizing the rules of the other circuits into a flexible standard,
yet still wanted the benefits of a rigid rule that would provide notice
and guidance to the lower courts. The court tried to achieve these
benefits by creating a three-part test that is a mixture of straightforward rules (parts one and two of the test) and a flexible standard
(part three of the test). However, by crafting the test in this way, it
failed to achieve any of the benefits. This Part first discusses the

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1319–20.
Id. at 1320.
Id.
Id. at 1320.
Id.
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conflict created among the circuits through the creation of the Tenth
Circuit’s hybrid rule and then discusses the inherent problems of the
third part of the rule.
A. Substantially in Conflict
The Tenth Circuit, by combining the two prevailing tests within
the circuits into one test, created a three-part test that conflicts with
nearly every other circuit to some degree. As a result, the Tenth
Circuit’s rule contributes to inconsistent outcomes in applying
RLUIPA and undermines precedent.
1. How the Tenth Circuit’s rule conflicts with the other circuits
Parts one and two of the Tenth Circuit’s rule mirror the rules
found in the District of Columbia and Seventh Circuits, but part
three of the test conflicts with the D.C. and Seventh Circuits. In
particular, the first two parts of the Tenth Circuit’s rule indicate that
a government substantially burdens an inmate’s religious expression
if it “requires” or “prevents” religiously expressive conduct.82
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit recognizes a substantial burden when the
government “forces” or “prevents [an inmate] from engaging in
conduct their religion requires.”83 Likewise, the Seventh Circuit
indicates that the government substantially burdens a plaintiff when
it “forces” or “compels conduct or expression that is contrary” to the
individual’s religious expression or “inhibits or constrains conduct or
expression” that is central to an individual’s religious belief.84 The
wording of these rules denotes a defined bright-line rule whereby a
court can easily ascertain whether the government’s action
significantly burdens the inmate’s religious expression, because the
words provide a more objective inquiry into the actions of the
government.85 Although these tests require a higher showing from a

82. Id. at 1315 (emphasis added).
83. Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
84. Mack v. O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added), rev’d on
other grounds, 522 U.S. 801 (1997). The Seventh Circuit later interpreted these phrases to
mean that the force or inhibition must be substantial enough to make an inmate’s religious
expression “effectively impracticable.” See Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 800 (7th Cir. 2008);
Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003).
85. To illustrate, it is easier for a court and an observer to objectively determine when a
rule or a regulation becomes so onerous that it effectively “forces” or “compels” an individual to
obey because we all have some natural sense or experience of being forced to act.
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plaintiff than the pressure standards used by other circuits, an
individual’s natural understanding and experience with these words
helps courts uniformly apply the law.
In contrast, part three of the Tenth Circuit’s rule allows mere
“substantial pressure” to be sufficient for a substantial burden—a less
stringent standard than parts one or two of the rule. Consequently,
by allowing “substantial pressure” to be sufficient for a “substantial
burden” within the Tenth Circuit, the third part of the court’s rule
conflicts with the rules articulated in the D.C. and Seventh Circuits,
where mere “pressure” is insufficient to constitute a substantial
burden.
Additionally, although part three of the Tenth Circuit’s rule is
ostensibly labeled a “substantial pressure” test, it is not really a
substantial pressure test and thus contradicts the substantial pressure
tests of the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.86
Specifically, the Tenth Circuit articulated its substantial pressure
standard to mean the pressure that occurs when “the government
presents the plaintiff with a Hobson’s choice—an illusory choice,
where the only realistic possible course of action trenches on the
adherent’s sincerely held religious belief.”87 Although the court
initially defined the term “pressure” with different synonyms,88 its
overall rule hinges on whether the government’s pressure constitutes
a Hobson’s choice for an inmate.
For instance, the court decided that the government substantially
burdened Abdulhaseeb’s religious expression because it provided
him with a Hobson’s choice.89 In reaching this holding, the court
determined that this occurs because a Hobson’s choice requires an
inmate to either violate his religious beliefs or forego “essentials,”
such as medical treatment,90 eating,91 or communicating with legal

86. See Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2007); Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d
174 (4th Cir. 2006); Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2004); San Jose Christian Coll.
v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2004); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of
Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004).
87. Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1315. This definition of pressure is attached by a dash to
the court’s initial articulation of the third part of the test, seemingly indicating that a Hobson’s
choice is what the court meant by “substantial pressure.”
88. See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.
89. Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1318
90. Id. (quoting Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1189 (10th Cir. 2002)).
91. Id. at 1315.
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representatives.92 Additionally, the court noted that Hobson’s
choices are “choices between options that are mutually
unacceptable” to the practice of the inmate’s religious faith.
Moreover, after noting that the pressure synonyms used by other
circuits were helpful in determining what constitutes substantial
pressure, the court stated that “not every infringement on a religious
exercise will constitute a substantial burden.”93 This statement,
which immediately follows the pressure synonym discussion, bolsters
the argument that the Tenth Circuit intended a higher, more
stringent test for substantial pressure than its sister circuits. As a
result, the Tenth Circuit’s substantial pressure test is not akin to the
substantial pressure tests of the other circuits, since it requires
pressure analogous to “forcing” or “compelling” an inmate to act
where the inmate does not really have a choice. However, the third
part is still a diluted and less stringent standard than the “forcing” or
“compelling” tests of the D.C. and Seventh Circuits, because the
Tenth Circuit still uses the pressure synonyms to advocate a lesser
standard similar to the ones used by the majority of the circuits.
Thus, the third part of the court’s rule conflicts to some degree with
nearly every other circuit.
2. Consequences of a synthesized rule that conflicts with other circuits
Using a synthesized rule that conflicts with all the other circuits
to some degree is problematic for two reasons: first, it contributes to
inconsistent outcomes; and second, it dilutes precedent and enables
lower courts in the Tenth Circuit to decide cases according to
preference—not precedent.
a. Inconsistent outcomes. An application of the different circuits’
tests to the facts of Abdulhaseeb highlights the problems that arise
with the Tenth Circuit’s synthesized rule. In particular, if
Abdulhaseeb were an inmate within the Seventh or D.C. Circuits, it
is unlikely that he could prove that OSP’s refusal to provide him with
a halal diet violated RLUIPA. Specifically, OSP’s actions likely fell
short of “forcing” or “compelling” him to act in a manner that was
contrary to his centrally held belief, since providing a Hobson’s
choice to an inmate does not rise to the level of “forcing” or

92. Id. at 1318 (quoting Beerheide, 286 F.3d at 1189).
93. Id. at 1316.
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“compelling” religious expression. This is evident from the reasoning
in Abdulhaseeb, where the court ignored the first two parts of its new
rule, which mirrored the D.C. and Seventh Circuit tests, and relied
on its third prong—substantial pressure—which incorporates the
Hobson’s choice reasoning to conclude that OSP likely violated
RLUIPA by failing to provide Abdulhaseeb with a diet.94
Consequently, although Abdulhaseeb faced the difficult decision of
choosing between eating food that was not within a halal diet and
not eating everything given to him and likely going hungry, it is
unlikely that this decision amounted to a substantial burden to his
religious expression under the D.C. and Seventh Circuit’s rules.
However, if Abdulhaseeb were an inmate within a circuit other
than D.C. or the Seventh, he would likely have a stronger argument
that OSP violated his rights by not providing a halal diet, since those
circuits follow a substantial pressure test. Nevertheless, although
Abdulhaseeb’s argument would be stronger in those circuits, there is
no absolute assurance Abdulhaseeb’s claim would meet their
substantial pressure standards, since the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning
regarding what constitutes substantial pressure is vague95 and
inconsistent with the substantial pressure standards of those
circuits.96 Thus, application of the different circuit tests to
Abdulhaseeb highlights the problem of having three different
standards: an inmate’s religious rights, rather than being protected
by RLUIPA (a national and theoretically uniformly-applied law), are
determined by the physical location of the inmate’s incarceration.
Therefore, the court should have decided which circuits had the best
argument and aligned itself with them, rather than creating a new
hybrid rule that exacerbates a split and creates a greater gamble for
an inmate and his or her rights under RLUIPA.
b. Decisions according to preference, not precedent. The Tenth
Circuit’s synthesized three-part rule is uniquely problematic because
it allows lower courts to select nearly any “substantial burden”
precedent from any circuit to support its preferred outcome.
Specifically, lower courts can draw analogies from any other circuit,
since the rule postulated by the Tenth Circuit contains at least one
prong that mirrors the rules and precedent of all the other circuits.
94. Id. at 1317–18.
95. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
96. See supra notes 86–93 and accompanying text.
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As a result, this ability to look to other circuits waters down the
precedential value of opinions within the Tenth Circuit, as lower
court judges are not necessarily bound by decisions within the Tenth
Circuit and can use decisions from different circuits to support their
desired result. Thus, the Tenth Circuit’s synthesized three-part rule
conflicts with its sister circuits and dilutes precedential value by
allowing judges to decide cases according to their preferences, but
not necessarily according to Tenth Circuit precedent.
B. Substantially Unneeded: The Need to Eliminate Part Three of the
Tenth Circuit’s Test
Abdulhaseeb was the first time the Tenth Circuit had the
opportunity to evaluate the “substantial burden” requirement of
RLUIPA,97 and as a result the court had a responsibility to draft the
rule in a manner that provided guidance to the lower courts.
However, the Tenth Circuit did not provide the needed guidance
but instead included a prong in its test that is substantially vague in
its explanation of what constitutes a substantial burden. Thus, part
three of the Tenth Circuit’s rule should be eliminated altogether.
1. Substantially vague
The third part of the Tenth Circuit’s rule states that the
government substantially burdens an inmate’s right to religious
expression if it “places substantial pressure on an adherent either not
to engage in conduct . . . or to engage in conduct contrary to a
sincerely held religious belief.”98 Notably, the Tenth Circuit tries to
define “substantial pressure” in two ways: first, it provides the
Hobson’s choice analogy,99 and second, it arbitrarily cites different
phrases from past Supreme Court decisions and then reasons that
they all apply in determining whether a burden is considered
substantial.100 Unfortunately, this reasoning is vague and does little
to define or articulate the meaning of substantial pressure.

97. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
98. Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1315.
99. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
100. Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1316. For example, the court cites six different Supreme
Court cases that use different language to articulate elements to weigh in determining whether
or not there is substantial pressure. Id. at 1315–16.
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a. Hobson’s choice. Although a “Hobson’s choice” explanation
seems to provide guidance for lower courts, a deeper look reveals
that it fails in this regard. Specifically, the court merely states that a
Hobson’s choice is a choice that essentially “trenches” on an
inmate’s religious expression. No guidance is given on the amount of
“trenching” that is required, or what exactly constitutes “trenching.”
The court tries to partially answer this question in a parenthetical,
nearly two pages after stating the trenching rule, by noting that
“forcing prisoners to decide between communicating with family and
legal representatives, seeking medical treatment, and following
religious tenets constitutes a Hobson’s choice rather than a true
alternative.”101 Regrettably, this parenthetical merely provides
examples, without explanations, of Hobson’s choices and fails to
provide lower courts with a standard or rule regarding how much
trenching or pressure an inmate must feel before it is deemed
“substantial.” Consequently, lower courts, and readers, are left to
their own devices in deciding the broad implications of substantial
pressure.
b. Arbitrary parenthetical phrases. In addition, the parenthetical
phrases used by the Tenth Circuit to explain substantial pressure are
inherently vague. In particular, the court notes that “indirect
coercion,”102 indirect “compulsion,”103 and the level of
“inconvenience”104 are factors to be considered in determining
substantial pressure. These words give little guidance to the lower
courts and seem circular since they are simply synonyms of
uncomfortable “pressure.” Again, lower courts and readers have little
guidance except perhaps the indication that they should check a
thesaurus for additional unhelpful adjectives in resolving what
actions constitute substantial pressure. Thus, the wording of the
third part of the rule and its reasoning are vague and provide little
assistance to the lower courts in determining when substantial
pressure constitutes a substantial burden.

101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 1318 (quoting Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1189 (10th Cir. 2002)).
See Lying v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450 (1998).
See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717 (1981).
See Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1278 (11th Cir. 2007).
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2. Substantially unneeded
This lack of reasoning for the Hobson’s choice analogy and
seemingly hodge-podge assortment of parenthetical phrases does not
provide judges with clear precedent that they must adhere to and
opens the door for lower courts to use their imagination to support
their desired outcome.105 In particular, a judge in a lower court could
have serious personal concerns about Islamic beliefs and, under the
guise of part three of the rule, discriminate against an inmate. This
lower court, using facts similar to Abdulhaseeb, could conclude that a
prison, failing to provide an inmate with a halal diet, did not violate
RLUIPA by reasoning that the refusal merely “urges” or
“encourages” an inmate to eat food contrary to his religious belief.
Further, the hypothetical court could reason that there is no
coercion or inconvenience, since an inmate can always choose not to
eat the non-halal food—a choice that any person on any kind of diet
is required to make daily, and not one that “trenches” on his
religious expression. Thus, lower courts can rely on synonyms to
dodge the current precedent given by the court and mask their
personal motives in the process. Additionally, as mentioned above,
part three of the rule compounds the current split in the circuits and
undermines precedential value within the Tenth Circuit.106
Consequently, the court, to avoid the potential confusion among the
lower courts, should eliminate the third part of its new test.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone does little
to resolve the confusion surrounding what constitutes a “substantial
burden” under RLUIPA. In particular, the synthesized rule adds to
the confusion and is problematic for two reasons. First, it
undermines precedent and aggravates the friction between the
various circuit rules by creating a hybrid rule. A split was inevitable,
since one already existed between the circuits, but by combining
rules the Tenth Circuit contradicts each of the other circuits’ rules in
some way and adds to the confusion of what constitutes a
“substantial burden.” Second, the Tenth Circuit should eliminate its
third prong, since it provides little guidance to the lower courts and

105. See supra Part V.A.2.b.
106. See supra Part V.A.2.
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has the potential of allowing judges to mask their personal feelings
and discriminate against inmates. Thus, to solve these problems and
provide guidance to lower courts, inmates, and prison facilities about
inmate religious rights for future cases, the Tenth Circuit should
eliminate the obstructive third part of its “substantial burden” rule.
D. Evan Pack
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